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INTRODUCTION

"Translation is the art of failure,"' yet it is necessary. In
international law, translation refers not only to language, but also
to legal concepts and legal cultures. This article describes the failure to escape the necessity of translation by the imposition of a
uniform set of laws. Intensifying global communications and
expanding businesses render accessibility to the legal standards
and laws of different countries a reality for international commer-

cial actors.2
The Inter-American region is particularly significant in its
need for accessible international sales law. Inter-American trade
accounted for over thirty percent of total U.S. trade in goods for
20053 and U.S. trade in goods with Mexico and Canada alone
totaled over $800 billion in 2005.' Canada and Mexico are the two
largest trading partners of the United States.5 Consequently,
great inefficiencies will result in the absence of an easily ascertainable set of laws governing the sale of goods.
The Convention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG")
attempts to facilitate trade by creating one common legal standard.' The CISG seeks to unify varying legal concepts of contract
law and create one coherent body of law for the contracting
states.7 Problems with translation, however, including differing
methods of interpretation, language and varying legal cultures,
complicate the goal of unification.
In examining the different sources of impediments to unification, this article focuses on Article 7 of the CISG as utilized by
Argentinean, Colombian, Mexican and U.S. courts. Article 7 of the
CISG purports to direct the interpretation of the Convention.'
Article 7(1) addresses interpretation of the Convention's three
major goals: regard for the international character of the Conven1. Quotation of Umberto Eco, Thinkexist.com, http://en.thinkexist.com/quotes/
umberto-eco (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
2. See Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized
System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & CoM. 187 (1998).
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS, Top TRADING PARTNERS TOTAL TRADE, EXPORTS, AND IMPORTS (Dec. 2005), www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

statistics/highlights/top/top0512.html.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods art. 7(2),

Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 673 (1980) [hereinafter CISGI.
7. See id. at pmbl.
8. See id. at art. 7.
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tion, promoting uniformity and good faith in international trade.9
Article 7(2) is a gap-filler for concepts intended to be governed by
the CISG but not expressly stated within. 10 The Article 7(2)
method provides a hierarchy: applying general principles upon
which the Convention is based before resorting to private international law in resolving an ambiguity."
The problems of interpretation of the CISG are a function of
judges interpreting the Convention through lenses cut by their
own legal culture and experiences. Consequently, interpretation
impedes the goals of unification and international character of the
Convention.
Reviewing the rationale of court opinions provides the strongest indication of the process by which domestic laws are imputed. I
suggest revisiting the creation of a common adjudicative body to
review contested cases beyond the initial country of litigation. A
final court should be instituted to ensure uniform results of the
interpretation of the CISG. Additionally, a final court can give
definitions to the enigmatic "general principles" in Article 7(2).12
The absence of such a supranational structure also leads to an
over-reliance on domestic laws. Consequently, using a court to
provide comprehensive contours to the "general principles" will
embody and promote the international character of the
Convention.
II.

GLOBALIZATION AS THE IMPETUS FOR ASPIRING
TOWARDS UNIFORMITY

In many respects globalization has dissolved the significance
of nation states. 3 National boundaries are determined by "geographic arbitrariness" while international commerce transcends
national borders. Although economic boundaries are blurred, cul9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in the InternationalSales
Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence,24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
299, 313-314 (2004).
12. CISG at art. 7(2).
13. See Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of InternationalCommercial
Law, 23 J.L. & COM. 117 (2004) ("Increasingly, nation states are becoming less
important in the creation of international commercial law with the growth of regional
organizations, non-state actors, and international arbitration. This is spurred on by
the march of globalization and the need for international commercial law.").
14. Russell Menyhart, Changing Identities and Changing Law: Possibilitiesfor a
Global Legal Culture, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 157, 160 (2003).
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tural, legal and linguistic borders remain. 15 Consequently, the
commercial expansion brought on by globalization requires a compatible legal structure. 6 That is not to say that current national
legal structures are completely ineffective in dealing with international commerce. However, different legal cultures (with competing national interests), various languages, and confusion amongst
foreign law, render individual, independent national legal systems
highly inefficient in dealing with the growing needs of international commerce. 7 The result is that "international commerce
needs uniform rules that do [not] dissolve with diverging national
interpretations."18
The era of globalization has had a significant effect on the
progression and transformation of international commerce. In the
Americas there are six different regional arrangements 9 that seek
to promote common markets and about twenty five bilateral
accords that focus on economic integration and free trade.20 The
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") is the most
powerful instrument put in place in North America regarding,
among other things, trade, business and investments.2 ' Additionally, on July 1, 2004, seven Latin American countries joined an
"Economic Complementation Agreement for the formation of a
15. See id.
16. See Bernard Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in
LEx

MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION,

139-40 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).

17. See Suggestions for Future Unification Techniques, ProgressiveCodification of
the Law of InternationalTrade: Note by the Secretariatof the InternationalInstitute
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 1970 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law Y.B., U.N. Sales No. E.71.v.1. ("[I]nternational trade also needs its own ordinary
law with its own particular role and full range of functions .... legal relationships of
international trade are international in character [which] puts them outside the
jurisdiction of municipal law and makes them governable by a law removed from any
national contingency. . .which alone can provide the legal framework which
international trade needs in order to develop.").
18. CLAUDE SAMSON, Analyse des Dispositions de la C.V.I.M. du Point de Vue du
Droit Civil Qudbecoise [Analysis of the CISG from the Point of View of the Civil Law of
Quebec] in

REPORT TO THE UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA ON CONVENTION ON

CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS,

168-305 Toronto (1981), available

at http://www.yorku.ca/osgoode/cisg/writings/samson.htm (translation by author).
19. See David A. Pawlak, InternationalTrade in the Americas: The Inter-American
Lawyer's Guide to Origin Determinations,5 TUL. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 317, 319 (1997)
(citing Peter Smith, The Politics of Integration: Concepts and Themes, in THE
CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 1, 13 n.4 (Peter Smith ed.,
1993)).
20. See id. (citing Special Report: Trade Outlook for 1995, INT'L TRADE RPTR., Jan.
18, 1995).
21. See Jorge A. Vargas, An Introductory Lesson to Mexican Law: From

Constitutions and Codes to Legal Culture and NAFTA, 41 SAN
1368 (2004).

DIEGO

L.

REV.

1337,

20061

INTERPRETIVE IMPEDIMENTS

229

Free Trade Area." 22
Uniform laws reduce restrictions and barriers to international trade, increasing efficiency in international commerce. By
contrast, local laws are protectionist, seeking to protect their local
industries. 23 Local laws create inefficient barriers and impediments that constrict commerce.24 Additionally, the Colombian
Constitutional Court remarked that unification would increase
commercialization of goods, resulting in a better quality of life for
the inhabitants in those countries. 25 The CISG proposes to unify
these regional efforts on a global scale to maximize the efficiency
of the economic integration through the use of uniform laws.26
On April 11, 1980, the CISG was adopted by diplomatic conference.2 1 It was then ratified by the United States in 1988.2 As
of July 17, 2006, there were sixty-eight member countries to the
CISG. 29 Thirteen of the sixty-eight are Inter-American countries.2
They include: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, the United States and Uruguay.3 1 Accordingly, the use of
the CISG encompasses a significant portion of commerce in the
Americas.
Developed from several failed attempts to unify contract law,
the CISG has successfully received a reputation for being the
"first sales law treaty to win acceptance on a worldwide scale."32
22. John R. Pate, Ram6n A. Azpfirua-Nufiez, and Patrizia F. Papaianni (Meaghan
McGrath Beaumont & Jonathan M. Miller Regional eds.), Inter-American Law, 38
INT'L LAW. 665, 690 (2004) (participating in this free trade agreement are: Venezuela,
Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay).
23. See James J. Callaghan, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Examining the Gap-FillingRole of CISG In Two French Decisions, 14
J.L. & COM. 183 (1995).
24. See id.
25. See Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Sentencia C-529/00,
Referencia: expediente, LAT-154, May 10, 2000 (Colom.) (Pablo A. Santos Jim6nez
trans., Jorge Oviedo Albdn ed.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/wais/
db/cases2/000510c7.html; see also discussion infra.
26. See Callagan, supra note 23, at 184-85.
27. See CISG at art. 101.
28. See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N.
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw. 443, 481
(1989) [hereinafter Garro, Reconciliation].
29. See Pace Law School, Legal Resources and Centers, CISG Database: CISG:
Table of ContractingStates, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. JOSEPH LoOKOFSKY,UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA: A COMPACT GUIDE
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As a tool for unifying contract law for the sake of international
commerce, the scope of the CISG is rather modest. That is, the
CISG only covers the law for the formation of the contract and the
obligations and duties stemming from the contract.3 Although
recourse to domestic law is necessary for various accompanying
issues,3' the CISG does provide the opportunity to avoid questions
of conflicts of law and answer questions of substantive law
35
directly.
The first part of this article looks at the sources of the obstacles to the goals of Article 7(1): promoting uniformity in the interpretation of the CISG. Article 7(1) states: "In the interpretation of
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade."3 6

III.

METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

Even on the most basic level of translation, interpretive methods are constrained. The obstacle: "all texts subject to human
communication.., must inherently have a certain degree of indeterminacy concerning their meaning."3 7 Moreover, linguists
argue, words do not have "an objective meaning existing independently of human agents."3" Accordingly, judges are constrained in
interpretation of the text of the CISG simply because it is a function of interpretation. The significance of recognizing this constraint calls for implementing a structure that responds directly
to it. Various responses have been attempted but none of the
methods sufficiently focus on the inherently subjective interpretative problem. Consequently, as discussed below, there is an
intrinsic need for supranational judicial authority for interpretive
guidance.
A.

"Autonomous"Interpretation

Many scholars have interpreted Article 7(1) to indicate that
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
SALE OF GOODS 1 (2d ed. 2004).
33. See CISG.
34. Id. at art. 4.
TO THE

ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL

35. Id. at art. 1.
36. Id. at art. 7(1).
37. Jan Engberg, Statutory Texts as Instances of Languages(s): Consequences and
Limitations on Interpretation,25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1135, 1139 (2004).
38. Id. at 1142.
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judges must interpret the CISG autonomously.3 9 Autonomous
interpretation divorces domestic law as an influence on questions
of interpretation that arise when deciding a case based on a provision in the Convention.4 ° Instead of domestic case law, scholars
advocate creating an international jurisprudence so that courts
will look to decisions made by other foreign courts to determine
the outcome of a given case.4 1 The method promotes uniformity in
accordance with Article 7(1). However, United States courts are
reluctant to use anything but a restrictive approach to interpretation of the text.4 2 The restrictive approach permits the "natural
bias for familiar domestic legal norms" to be the method of interpretation.4 3 However, this approach is in direct opposition to the
goals of the Convention, namely that "[tihe interpretive standards
of the CISG article 7 .... establish[] a means for interpreters to
develop the law under an international convention in a manner
entirely free from the influence of domestic legal norms."4 4 By contrast, the restrictive method encourages courts to refer to their
own legal systems and concepts to define legal terms. Commentators refer to this problem as the "homeward trend."4" In practice it
has been found that U.S. courts rely on the '%omeward trend"
more often than other judges in interpreting the CISG: "United
States judges will tend to seek authoritative guidance from the
texts of prior judicial or arbitral decisions, whereas European
judges will be inclined to rely far more on academic commentary."4" Uniformity cannot be achieved when judiciaries rely on
their own "domestic legal norms" in interpreting ambiguities in
the CISG.4 ' The "homeward trend" as a method of interpretation
in the United States remains one of the greatest obstacles to the
39. See Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale
di Vigevano (Italy), 12 July 2000, NS Vol. 6, UNIFORM LAW REVIEW / REVUE DE DROIT
UNIFORME, 203, 204 (2001).
40. See id. at 205.
41. See id. at 206.
42. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation,146 U. PA. L. REV.
687, 691-92 (1998).
43. Id. at 693.
44. Id. at 733.
45. Id. at 704 (citing Michael F. Sturley, The 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21
TEx. INT'L L. J. 540, 542 (1986)).
46. Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity, 15 J.L. &

COM. 175, 176 (1995) (reviewing
ET DE JURISPRUDENCE

CLAUDE WITZ, PARis: LIBRAIRIE Gr.NRALE DE DROIT

(1995)).

47. Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 693-94.
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creation of a foreign law based jurisprudence for the CISG.45
B.

The U. C.C. and the Use of Analogous Domestic
Legal Concepts

Autonomous interpretation also means abandoning domestic
techniques used to resolve interpretive problems. Professor Ferrari has discredited the use of analogizing the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") as an interpretive method for understanding
the CISG. 49 He writes: "Article 7(1) demands that the Convention
not be read through the lenses of domestic law." 0 These "lenses"
do not simply highlight the absence of the use of foreign jurisprudential decisions concerning the CISG. Rather, he argues,
although the UCC greatly influenced the CISG drafters, "it is
impossible... to assert that the... sets of rules [of the UCC and
CISGI are similar in content, or, even worse, that they 'are sufficiently compatible to support claims of overall consistency."''
According to this view, the UCC and the CISG are simply not
analogous. 2 For instance, the concept of good faith in CISG Article 7(1) indicates that good faith is a "mere instrument of interpretation," while the UCC refers to good faith as, among other things,
the direct obligation on the parties to a contract.53
Nonetheless, a methodological approach that discounts the
use of analogies to domestic legal concepts seems impractical if
not impossible. In particular, a judge looking to interpret a provision needs some frame of reference to assist in understanding that
provision. Moreover, the provisions of the CISG are "the result of
a compromise rather than a consensus."' That is, the basis of a
particular foundation makes an implicit reference to various legal
48. Curran, supra note 46, at 176.
49. See Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the
Construction of Uniform Law, 29 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1996) [hereinafter
Ferrari, Relationship].
50. Id. at 1026 (citing John 0. Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action - Uniform
InternationalWords: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & CoM. 207 (1988)).
51. Id. at 1023 (quoting Elizabeth H. Patterson, United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Unification and the Tension Between
Compromise and Domination, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 263, 275 (1986)).
52. See id. at 1033.
53. See CISG at art. 7(1); Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 1-203 (2004). But
see Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 779-82 (indicating that good faith has a more
expansive role in the CISG and should be regarded as a "general principle" referred to
in Article 7(2)); Harry Flechtner, Comparing the General Good FaithProvisions of the
PECL and the UCC: Appearance and Reality, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 295, 299-300
(2001).
54. Garro, Reconciliation, supra note 28, at 481.
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traditions including the UCC. Although simple analogies to the
UCC would violate the uniformity principle, it is impossible for
judges to interpret the provisions in the absence of a clear indication of what the legal concept actually represents. Additionally,
many American judges interpreting the provisions are not specialized in international law and, therefore, the burden of interpreting legal concepts in the abstract with deference to "uniformity"
and "international character of the Convention" is too great.
Judges, if discouraged from looking to domestic concepts, should
have guidelines and other available standards for comparison.
Consequently, a completely autonomous interpretation devoid of a
supranational organization to provide guidance is an ideal that is
impractical and without meaning beyond theoretical conceptions
of what is required to achieve a theoretical absolute uniformity.
IV.

THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORMITY PRINCIPLE

Before detailing further obstacles to uniformity and the international character of the CISG, it is important to look at the
meaning of uniformity. The text of Article 7(1) supports the argument that the drafters did not intend to create absolute uniformity of application of the provisions. Article 7(1) states, "regardis
to be had to.. .the need to promote uniformity in its application."5
Both the words "regard" and "promote" lack the definitive force of
absolute uniformity. Of course, "uniformity" remains a goal of the
Convention, but it should be read in light of the other goals of the
Convention.
V.

A.

OBSTACLES TO UNIFORMITY

Language, Translation and the Text

"The rules were meant to be simple, accessible, and effective." 6 The CISG is a short collection of 101 articles with seemingly simple and straightforward language. 7 However, the
simplicity and brevity of the CISG is bound to fall short of completeness. Moreover, the "technicalities and idiosyncrasies"59
that are particular to a certain legal culture have been eliminated." Adding to the complexities of the 'simple' language, the
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

CISG at art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
Audit, supra note 16, at 143.
See CISG.
See id. at art. 7(2).
Audit, supra note 16, at 143.
See id.
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articles have also been referred to as compromises. 61 That is, many
of the embodied rules are compromises between scholars from different legal cultures. Consequently, the legal significance of a
particular word or phrase is in part a function of a given compromise.62 Given the structure and composition of the CISG, various
ambiguities in the text of the CISG exist.
Although many Latin American countries that are members
to the CISG share a common language, the application of the
CISG in the Inter-American perspective maintains the obstacle of
varying languages. For instance, "[elach national legal system
uses terminology that does not necessarily correspond with the
legal languages of other countries. . . the English expression[ I
comprise[s] of different legal concepts [than]... concontract.
6
trato." Additionally, where the "CISG covers certain types of
contracts which in some domestic laws do not correspond to the
traditional notions of 'sales' contracts, it is not always easy to
ascertain which contracts fall within the sphere of application."'
One method the drafters used to generate uniformity was to
promulgate the CISG in six official languages." A consequence of
this method was an unintended non-uniformity.6 6 For example,
there exist discrepancies between two versions of the official languages of the Convention that were unintended, because "the
nature of language and translation makes such an ideal impossible to achieve."67 For example, when looking at Article 7(1) in
English, French and Spanish, it is clear that lexical choices play a
role in creating these ambiguities:
[English]: In the interpretation of this Convention, regard
is to be had... to the need to PROMOTE uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in interna61. Garro, Reconciliation, supra note 28, at 459-60.
62. See Garro, Reconciliation, supra note 28.
63. Ana M. L6pez-Rodrfguez, Towards a European Civil Code without a Common
European Legal Culture? The Link Between Law, Language and Culture, 29 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 1195, 1200 (2004) (emphasis added).
64. Michael Joachim Bonell & Fabio Liguori, The U.N. Convention on the
InternationalSale of Goods: A CriticalAnalysis of Current InternationalCase Law 1997 (Part1), NS Vol. 2,

UNIFORM

LAw REVIEW REVUE

DE DROIT UNIFORME,

385, 385-

95 (1997).
65. See CISG at art. 101. Cf., Flechtner, supra note 2, at 192-193 (stating that
there are six official languages but the various other translations in contracting states
will be primary sources for courts and practitioners in countries that lack an official
version).
66. See Flechtner, supra note 2, at 207.
67. Id. at 206.
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tional trade.6"
[Spanish]: En la interpretaci6n de la presente Convenci6n
se tendrdn en cuenta.
.la necesidad de PROMOVER la
uniformidad en su aplicaci6n y de

ASEGURAR

la observancia

de la buena fe en el comercio internacional s
[French]: Pour l'interpr~tation de la pr~sente Convention, il
sera tenu compte de. . .la n6cessit6 de PROMOUVOIR
l'uniformit de son application ainsi que D'ASSURER le
respect de la bonne foi dans le commerce international."
The English use of the verb "promote" qualifies both the goals
of uniformity and the observance of good faith in international
trade. 1 However the Spanish and French versions of the texts
utilize different verbs in regards to uniformity and the observance
of good faith. "To promote" ("promover"/"promouvoir") is the
choice in the Spanish and French texts in reference to the uniformity principle while "to assure" ("asegurar"/"assurer") is the
lexical choice qualifying the goal of the observance of good faith.
The courts will ultimately be responsible for determining the significance of these differences. However, the focus here is on the
existence of such lexical choices and their potential impact for disparities in interpretations. Put another way, the different linguistic choices creating such ambiguities have an impact on the legal
predictability of a given provision.72
68. CISG at art. 7(1).
69. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Convencion de Las Naciones Unidas Sobre
Los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderias (CNUCCIM-CISG),
http://www.uc3m.es/cisg/textoc.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
70. Pace Law School CISG Database, Convention des Nations Unies sur les
contratsde vente internationalede merchandises,http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgtext/
salecf.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
71. See Harry M. Flechtner, Another CISG Case in the U.S. Courts:Pitfalls For the
Practitionerand the PotentialFor Regionalized Interpretations,15 J.L. & CoM. 127,
136 (1995).

72. See also Flechtner, supra note 2, at 190-192. An example of textual nonuniformity can be seen in Articles 71 and 72 regarding anticipatory breach. Fletchner
argues that 71 requires only the appearance of non-performance of a substantialpart
of the obligations, whereas avoidance of the contract requires clarity that a
fundamental breach will occur. The English version of the text distinguishes between
the looking out for a substantial breach, as opposed to a fundamental breach.
However, the French text uses the word essentielle in both Articles 71 and 72 (looking
out for a breach of an essential part of the contract). The Spanish version of the text
supports Professor Fletchner's argument because it follows the same linguistic
structure as the English version. UniversidadCarlos III de Madrid, Convencion de
Las Naciones Unidas Sobre Los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de
Mercaderias(CNUCCIM-CISG), Art. 71, 72, http://www.uc3m.es/cisg/textoc.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2006). That is Article 71 in the Spanish version uses the word
sustancial, while Article 72 uses, esencial. Id. Moreover, esencial is the same word
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Legal Culture

Absence of a Common Legal Culture

The absence of a common legal culture is another obstacle to
uniformity of international sales law. A common legal culture
refers to a common socioeconomic and political structure, combined with a common general legal framework, which plays a significant role in how legal rules are understood and applied.73 As
described above, a common language facilitates the common
framework of legal principles.74
Legal culture provides "national glasses" for the application
and understanding of the laws and general principles of the
laws.75 The common general legal framework develops through
common legal culture and shared legal discourse. 6 For example,
in the United States, education and accessibility to common legal
literature promotes a common legal culture.77 The absence of a
basic authority and a common legal thinking constitutes a significant hurdle for the Inter-American landscape. 7 The problem is
further intensified because of the lack of access to international
legal sources.79 Comprehensive research websites such as those
generated by Uncitral and Pace Law School have removed some of
the barriers creating greater availability. 0 However, language
still plays a large role in the accessibility of these sources because
adequate translations of caselaw and research are simply nonexistent. Moreover, Professor Garro writes:
Basic research tools such as updated and comprehensive
legislative and case-law reports of other Latin American
countries are out of reach of most Latin American law
libraries. Even if adequate sources were available, a notoused in the Spanish version in Article 25 when describing the breach that permits
avoidance (In English, fundamental breach). Id. at art. 25.
73. See L6pez-Rodrfguez, supra note 63, at 1206; Alejandro M. Garro, Unification
and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 597
(1992) [hereinafter Garro, Unification].
74. See L6pez-Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 1208.
75. Id. at 1206.
76. See id. at 1208-1209, 1214.
77. See id. at 1207-1208.
78. Cf. id. at 1208-1209 (indicating that lack of common legal thinking and
common language make achieving legal uniformity in the European Union difficult).
79. See Garro, Unification, supra note 73, at 611.
80. See Pace Law School, CISG Database, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006); UNCITRAL, International Sale of Goods (CISG) and Related
Transactions, http://www.uncitral.orgluncitral/en/uncitral-texts/salegoods.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006).
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riously underpaid academic community and an understaffed and overworked judiciary is unlikely to be able to
process, digest and think over the many intricate issues
posed by legal unification.8 '
2.

Common Law and Civil Law Traditions

The obstacle of a common legal culture is amplified by the differences between the common law and civil law systems. 2 These
differences demonstrate how the civil law and common law systems lead to divergences in application and understanding of the
laws. Specifically, the civil law system focuses on the legal rule
while the common law tradition gives priority to practical experience.13 Thus, the varying role of precedent influences the differences in interpretation. In common law countries the judiciary
emphasizes the binding nature of its own precedent and is reluctant to look beyond it. In contrast, civil law countries tend to stick
very closely to the text itself, and rely less on precedent. The common law system places judges and the judiciary in the center of
the legal system with a focus on stare decisis and a strong conception of judicial review.' In contrast, the traditional civil law system makes the legislature the center of law making and law
modification." Judges are the caretakers of the law who must
apply the law as it was given to them by the legislature. 6 In more
contemporary civil law countries (primarily in Latin American
countries) the executive branch has a significant influence on the
powers of the Supreme Court. 7 For example, an Argentinean
Supreme Court Justice nominee may assert during nomination
hearings that he is qualified because he is "a friend of the President."8 Differing conceptions of rules, principles, precedent and
the role of the judiciary highlight some of the impediments that
exist in interpretation of the CISG.
81. Garro, Unification, supra note 73, at 611.
82. Cf L6pez-Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 1209 (indicating disparities between
common law and civil law make common legal culture difficult to achieve in the
European Union).
83. See id.
84. See Vargas, supra note 21, at 1353.
85. See Richard J. Wilson, Reflections on JudicialReview in Latin America, SW. J.
L. & TRADE AM. 435, 441 (2000).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 442 (citing Jonathan M. Miller, Evaluatingthe Argentine Supreme Court
Under Presidents Alfonsin and Menem (1983-1999), 7 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 2
(2000)).
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The Mexican legal system illustrates the focus of a civil law
system. In Mexico, unlike the United States, there is no doctrine
of stare decisis, meaning that the Mexican decisions "carry no
legally binding force in deciding subsequent judicial cases."89
However, the Supreme Court decisions do gain precedential value
by function of certain formalities in the Mexican legal system.90
First, judicial decisions are called Ejecutoriaswhich are published
in the Federal Judicial Weekly and are meant to inform lower
courts of the Supreme Court's reasoning.9 These Ejecutorias
influence the decisions of the lower courts, legislators and public
officials.9 2 Second, legally binding decisions or, Jurisprudencias,
develop when there are five uninterrupted and consecutive judicial resolutions by the Supreme Court of Justice or the Circuit
Collegiate Tribunal with the same legal holding.93 These must be
decided by the eight Justices in the Supreme Court en banc or by
four Justices in the Supreme Court Chamber. 94 Accordingly, the
process of developing binding precedent is significantly slower in
the Mexican civil law system than under the U.S. common law
system.
CISG Article 79 also illustrates another interpretive problem
resulting from diverging legal traditions. This article refers to the
concept of anticipatory repudiation and permits an avoidance of
the contract when one of the parties is facing an impediment that
is out of their control. 9 5 However, what determines an impediment seems to differ between civil law and common law countries.
The meaning of impediment relates to its definition within the
common legal culture in which the article is interpreted.96
However, it has been argued that divergence in the common
and civil law traditions has less of an effect on the promotion of
uniformity than would be expected. For instance, with the varying degrees of differences in legal culture, the Mexican legal culture has "borrowed" and incorporated many values from the U.S.
system.9 7 The differences in legal cultures become minimized as
countries incorporate different ideas and values into their own
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Vargas, supra note 21, at 1353.
See id.
See id. at 1353-1354.
See id. at 1354.
See id. at 1353.
See id.
See CISG at art. 79.
See generally JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 480-85 (3rd ed. 1999).
97. See Vargas, supra note 21, at 1365-66.
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legal culture. This exchange is often a byproduct of "aggressive
marketing and commercial strategies of transnational corporations to penetrate the Mexican market."98
Problems of interpretation remain as the greatest impediments to uniformity. The sources of those impediments lie with
complexities of varying languages, the inadequacy of translated
materials and diverging legal cultures. One possible solution is an
organized tribunal dealing with questions of interpretation that
give definitive interpretations when discrepancies and difficulties
arise. Such a tribunal could consist of scholars, CISG commentators and judges that frequently adjudicate CISG cases. The goal
of uniformity (even if not absolute uniformity) in commercial law
cannot be achieved without regard to a supranational organization that has the power to decide complex interpretive matters
and to provide standards and guidelines. The possibility of referencing one adjudicative body on particular matters of interpretation will also ease the impediments to accessing resources that
exist primarily in Latin American countries. Additionally, in promoting uniformity, a decision from a supranational body should
have greater weight than any one particular decision in a foreign
country.

VI.

ARTICLE

7(2)

AS A

TOOL OF INTERPRETATION

The tool of interpretation laid out in Article 7(2) is a gap filler
meant to assist judges in interpreting matters governed by the
Convention but that are not expressly settled in the Convention.9 9
The text of Article 7(2) reflects a hierarchy in the methods of interpretation to be used when courts are filling in the gaps. 10 First,
the court is required to refer to the general principles upon which
the Convention is based. 10' Second, recourse to the laws applica0 2
ble by private international law is appropriate.'
The second part of this article analyzes the meaning of Article
7(2), then reviews how the courts in the Americas have interpreted the term "general principles" in their decisions.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1362.
See CISG at art. 7(2).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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"[Miattersgoverned by this Convention which are
not expressly settled"

Article 7(2) states:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or,
in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law. 103
When courts determine which issues fall under Article 7(2) as
"matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled," courts should refer to issues expressly excluded from the
CISG.104 For instance, Article 4 expressly excludes all matters
regarding validity and property rights. °5 Therefore, where matters of the validity of the contract and the property rights related
to the issue are before the court, it is appropriate to review the
matters under rules applicable by virtue of private international
law and not under "general principles of law."106 Additionally,
Article 5 excludes matters regarding liability of the seller for
death or personal injury.0 7 Article 6 permits the parties to
exclude any article of the Convention. 0 8 Therefore, if the parties
derogate from an article, reference to domestic law would be the
appropriate method of interpretation. Moreover, countries have
the right to make reservations in reference to certain articles that
render those articles inapplicable to reserving states.' 9 Matters
that are included in the CISG and that fall within the scope of the
Convention should be resolved in accordance with hierarchy of
methodological interpretation described in Article 7(2). Consequently, matters expressly excluded from the CISG are not governed by the CISG and, as such, Article 7(2) would be
inapplicable.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

CISG
CISG
CISG
CISG
CISG

at art. 4.
at art. 7(2).
at art. 5.
at art. 6.
at art. 92.
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"GeneralPrinciples"."[M]oored to the premises
that underlie specific provisions of the
Convention"110

The definition of "general principles upon which the Convention is based" falls short of receiving any clear interpretation in
the scholarly works. Reference is made to these principles in Article 7(2) without further explanation."' Jeffrey Hartwig writes that
the "[gleneral principles are to be derived from the Convention's
own provisions."" 2 Moreover, Professor Honnold writes that a
"particular general principle must be moored to premises that
underlie specific provisions of the Convention."' 3 Specifically,
some of the "general principles" originating from the Convention
itself include: good faith;"' the reasonableness principle;" 5 the
principle that each party should communicate information needed
by the other party;" 6 the estoppel principle that a party cannot
effectively contradict its own statement on which the other party
has relied; 1 7 the principle disfavoring premature contract termination;"8 the principle requiring parties to mitigate losses from
the other party's breach;" 9 freedom of contract and party autonomy; 2 ° the principle that international sales contracts should not
be subject to formal writing requirements; 2 ' and the general presumption that parties have formed a binding contract.'2 2
110. Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 778 (A "particular general principle must be
moored to premises that underlie specific provisions of the Convention." (citing
HONNOLD, supra note 96, at 155)).
111. See CISG at art. 7(2).
112. Jeffrey R. Hartwig, Schmitz-Werke GMBH & Co. v. Rockland Industries Inc.
and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods
(CISG): Diffidence and Developing InternationalLegal Norms, 22 J. L. & COM. 77, 84
(2003); see also Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 692.
113. See Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 778 (citing HoNNOLD, supra note 96, at 155).
114. See Henry Mather, Choice of Law for InternationalSales Issues Not Resolved
by the CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 157 (2001) (citing M.J. Bonell, Article 7, in
COMMENTARY
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAw: THE
1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTION 80, 84-85 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., 1987)).
115. See id. (citing Rolf Herber, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 59, 67 (Peter Schlechtriem ed.,
Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d ed. 1998)).
116. See id. (citing Herber, supra note 115, at 67).
117. See id. (citing Bonell, supra note 114, at 81).
118. See id. (citing Bonell, supra note 114, at 81).
119. See id. (citing Bonell, supra note 114, at 81).
120. See id. at 158 (citing Bonell, supra note 114, at 80).
121. See id. (citing Bonell, supra note 114, at 80).
122. See id. (citing Bonell, supra note 114, at 81).
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C. Broader Purposes of the Convention
Interpreting "general principles" as only those derived from
the Convention is too narrow of a construction.'23 The clause "on
which [the Convention] is based"124 does not preclude principles
that are not expressly or even implicitly stated in the text of the
Convention. Moreover, the rule does not even explicitly reference
to drafters' intent. 125 Therefore, there is no constricting rule that
the interpretation must be bound to the specific intent of the
drafters.'26 The interpretation of Article 7(2) should not be too
rooted in formalism but should look to the Convention's broader
purposes as espoused in Article 7(1).127
D.

Fluid and Evolving Principles

Additionally, courts should take an expansive view of "general
principles" because "[a]n international convention. . .is a living
thing, [a] maturing body of law, founded on certain fundamental
values but capable of adapting new interpretations for changed
environments." 12' The "general principles" should be interpreted

as evolving with and following the changes and transitions in
international commerce. The goal of "international character" 129
by its nature is one of constant movement and evolution, thereby
requiring the Convention to follow. Moreover, this perspective of
Article 7(2) is consistent with the purpose of the Article, to resolve
matters "not expressly settled," those issues that will arise in the
future.'
Furthermore, many of the rules are open-ended, such
that they "derive their content from post-hoc application to real
world cases."' 3 ' As a result, the untreated or unanticipated matters governed by the CISG require interpretations that are "fluid"
and evolving." 2
123. See Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 778 (arguing that the general principles do
not have to be "embedded" in the Convention).
124. CISG at art. 7(2).
125. See id.
126. See Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 778.
127. See id. at 774 (rejecting a restrictive textual approach to treaty interpretation
for a more equitable interpretation of the general principles).
128. Id. at 783.
129. CISG at art. 7(1).
130. See generally id. at 776 (detailing why interpretation should consider changes
in societal values and legal context after a statute's adoption).
131. DiMatteo et al., supra note 11, at 317-318.
132. Van Alstine, supra note 42, at 776-77 (arguing that the code like structure of
the Convention requires the flexibility in interpretation to "adapt to circumstances
unforeseen at the time of their adoption").
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"Restatements"of International Contract Law:
UNIDROIT and PECL

Professor Guillemard advocates the use of principles of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT") and the Principles of European Contract Law
("PECL") as a source of "general principles" in Article 7(2), yet
another reason why this article should receive a more expansive
interpretation.133 The UNIDROIT principles are intended to apply
13
in commercial contracts and are meant to be used worldwide. 1
PECL can be applied in commercial transactions but was originally drafted to create unified contract law for Europe. 13 However, both treatises were drafted as general principles of law and
share the common goals of the CISG in promoting uniformity in
contract law. 36 PECL even cites the CISG as one of its sources. 37
Although the UNIDROIT principles and PECL cover more matters than the CISG (for example, issues of validity of the contract
are not covered by the CISG), 3 s these principles can and should be
used by courts, instead of their domestic legal systems, as a tool of
interpretation for Article 7(2) when defining "general principles."
VII.

"GENERAL PRINCIPLES" INTERPRETED BY
INTER-AMERICAN COURTS

Interestingly, courts lacking in a comprehensive understanding of "general principles" have varying methods of interpretation
ranging from avoiding the interpretation, to analogizing to their
own legal systems a particular provision, to providing a suggestion of what the general principles should be. The following is a
case study of how courts in the Americas are dealing with the
question of "general principles."
A.

Argentina

In Elastar Sacifia v. Bettcher Industries Inc., the Buyer was
an Argentinean firm in the process of bankruptcy proceedings and
133. See Sylvette Guillemard, A ComparativeStudy of the UNIDROIT Principlesof
European Contractsand Some Dispositionsof the CISG Applicable to the Formationof
International Contracts from the Perspective of Harmonisation of Law, Laval
University, May 23, 1999, http://www.yorku.ca/osgoode/cisg/writings/guille.htm.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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the Seller was an American creditor. 13s The Seller claimed a credit
based on the international sale of goods.14 ° The Seller filed a claim
for $3,249.55 and was awarded $3,065.61.141 The Seller appealed
the dismissal of the $183.94 representing the interest portion of
the Seller's claim.'42 In interpreting the Convention, the court
found that there was no express provision providing for the
amount of interest that should be paid. 143 In resolving the question of amount of interest, the court relied on Article 9(2) of the
Convention, which looks to the widely accepted practices in international commerce.' First, the court disclaimed the lower court
opinion for relying on the Argentinean Code, which was inapplicable because the CISG applied.145 Second, the court stated that only
matters that could not be resolved by the Convention should be
solved by the rules of private international law. 14 6 The court correctly referred to the hierarchy of interpretation principles as it
proceeded to general principles.4 7
By contrast, in Cerveceria y Malteria Paysandd S.A. v.
CerveceriaArgentina S.A., the court failed to identify any general
principles under Article 7(2) and quickly referred to rules of private international law for a resolution.'4 8 Here, a Seller from Uruguay sued an Argentinean Buyer for the price of malted barley
139. See Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia en lo Comercial No. 7 [la Inst.]
[State Lower Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction] (Buenos Aires), 20 May 1991, "Elastar
Sacifia v. Bettcher Industries Inc. / commercial," (Arg.), Alejandra Truscello, trans.,
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/910520al.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Elastar Sacifia].
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.; see also Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of
Judicial Application and Scholarly Writing, 15 J. L. & COM. 1, 116-126 (1995)
(indicating that some scholars agree that interest rates are governed by the CISG but
make reference to Article 78 and not commercial practice as the rationale)
[hereinafter Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG].
146. See ElastarSacifia, supra note 139.
147. See id. But see Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG, supra note 145, at 120
(arguing that there are many scholars that believe that interest rates are a matter not
governed by the Convention and therefore should be determined by rules of private
international law by virtue of Article 7(2)).
148. See C~mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de Buenos Aires
[CNCom.] [Court of Appeals in Comercial Matters for Buenos Aires], Nov. 7, 2002,
"Cerveceria y Malteria Paysandfi S.A. v. Cervecera Argentina S.A.," La Ley [L.L.]
(2003-D-416) (Arg.), Jorge Oviedo Albdn trans., available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/020721al.html [hereinafter Cerveceriay Malteria].
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delivered to and accepted by the Buyer. 149 The Buyer objected on
the ground that the goods delivered were defective.1 5° The Appellate court affirmed the lower court decision in favor of the Seller
15
because the Buyer failed to prove the defectiveness of quality. '
The court based its decision on the Argentinean Commercial Code
reasoning that the procedure of determining evidence required the
Buyer to prove that the non-conformity was a matter not
expressly determined in the CISG.'1 2 Rather, the court stated that
the provisions regarding warranty in the CISG "coincide in
essence with those contained in [the Argentinean] Civil Code and
Commercial Code."" 3 Moreover, the court swiftly dismissed the
idea of general principles that could resolve the matter, simply
stating that "the CISG does not contain any rule-or general principle-concerning the procedure to follow to determine the quality
of goods."5 4 The court made no reference to foreign case law,
scholarly commentary or any other source that gives depth to the
meaning of "general principles."'5 5
It is problematic that the court ignores the relevance of Article 35 that clearly identifies warranties and the nature of conforming goods as being governed by the CISG. The court should
have resolved this issue by looking at Article 35(2)(a): ". . . the
goods do not conform with the contract unless they are fit for the
purpose for which the goods of the same description 5 would ordinarily be used."15 7 The court should have referenced "general principles" because matters surrounding warranties are clearly
governed by the CISG, although they are not expressly settled
within.'5 8 The court's gloss-over of the general principle exemplifies its over-reliance on domestic law in violation of the uniformity
principle.
Alternatively, the court found that the Buyer failed to give
timely notice of the non-conformity under the requirements of
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See generally id.
156. "Description" in Article 35(2)(a) should be understood as "description required
by the contract" from Article 35(1): "The seller must deliver goods which are of the
...description required by the contract." CISG at art. 35(1).
157. CISG at art. 35(2).
158. See CISG at art. 35.
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Argentinean law.'59 The court could have relied, however, on Article 39(1) of the CISG which states that the buyer "loses the right
to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give
notice to the seller. . .within a reasonable time after he has discovered it."160 Nevertheless, the court erroneously interpreted the
Convention to conclude that a matter concerning the conformity of
61
goods cannot be resolved by general principles.
B.

Canada

The Canadian courts have not yet directly applied Article
7(2).
C.

Colombia

The Colombian Constitutional Court approved the constitutionality of the CISG on May 10, 2000, making the CISG applicable in Colombia from that date forward. 62 However, the only case
law generated from Colombia referencing the CISG is the Constitutional Court decision.163 The Court uses Article 7 in its analysis." It looks at good faith as a general principle that is to be
observed in contractual negotiations and also between the relationships of individuals and the State in procedural performances.'65 Therefore, "good faith" is a greater obligation embodied
under "general principles" in Article 7(2) and not simply a tool of
interpretation. However, in reasoning that good faith is a general
principle, the court cites a Colombian Court decision that looks to
good faith as it conforms to the Magna Carta.166 The court fails to
159. See Cerveceriay Malteria, supra note 148.
160. CISG at art. 39(1).
161. See Cerveceriay Malteria, supra note 148.
162. See Corte Constitucional, [Juris. C. Con.] [Constitucional Court], Sentencia C529/00; Referencia: expediente LAT-154, 10 May 2000 (Col.), Pablo A. Santos
Jim~nez, trans., available at www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000510c7.
html [hereinafter Colombian Constitutional Court]; see also Patricia Rinc6n Martin,
Editorial Remarks, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/
000510c7.html. In Colombia, the President has the power to initiate the approval of
international treaties. The bill is first sent to Congress and approved as a regular law

by the House of Representatives and the Senate and then it is sent to the
Constitutional Court to ensure that the law conforms with the Colombian
Constitution.
163. See Pace University School of Law, CISG Database, Country Case Schedule,
Colombia, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgtext/casecit.html#colommbia (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
164. See Colombian Constitutional Court, supra note 162.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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interpret the CISG and the determination of general principles
autonomously.
Nevertheless, some deference should be given to the fact that
the purpose of the Constitutional Court is to determine whether
the international treaty is Constitutional under Colombian law,
necessarily requiring domestic lenses of these international concepts. Additionally, since this is the only Colombian decision
available, it is unclear if the Colombian Courts will be faulted
with the "homeward trend."
D.

Mexico

In Dulces Luisi v. Seoul International, a Mexican Seller
brought suit against a Korean Buyer for failure to pay the price
for goods received and also for false representations regarding
their intention to pay for the goods.'67 In analyzing the Buyer's
breach, the court referred to Article 7's good faith principle and
determined that it is a general principle that binds the parties to
act in good faith throughout their contractual relations.16 8 In reference to the general principle of good faith, the court relied on the
duty of good faith as one being fundamental in international
trade, thereby complying with the goals of the Convention laid out
in Article 7(1).169
However, the court's rationale is not absent of reliance on
domestic rules. In its discussion of this general principle, the
court stated: "To limit or exclude it would be equal to a failure to
acknowledge the axis that regulates international trade, as understood in international trade, unbound from the meaning given to
it in Mexican law." 170 The court's reference to the principle of good
faith under the CISG as a principle bound by Mexican law, is on
its face in contrast to the concept of autonomous interpretation.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, an absolute autonomous interpretation is impractical. Moreover, the court conforms and looks
to the general principles of international law in order to arrive at
167. See DICTAMEN relativo a la queja promovida por Dulces Luisa, S.A. de C.V.,
en contra de. Seoul InernationalCo. Ltd., y Seoulia Confectionary Co., Comisi6n para
la Protecci6n del Comercio Exterior de M~xico [Mexican Comission for the Protection
of Foreign Trade] [Compromex], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], Tomo DXLIV
No. 20, 29 de enero de 1999, Pigina 69 (Mex.), Alejandro Osuna Gonzdlez, trans.,
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgtwais/db/cases2/981130ml.html.
168. Id. 9.
169. Id. T 10 & n.3.
170. Id.
10.
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its conclusion.' 7 ' It thereby promoting the goals of the Convention
set out in Article 7(1) and (2).
E.

United States

In the United States there is a strong tendency to rely on
domestic analogies, methods of interpretation and domestic case
law in interpreting matters that fall within the scope of the
CISG. 172 This tendency is exemplified in the most recent published U.S. case citing Article 7(2), ChicagoPrime Packers, Inc. v.
Northam Food Trading Co. 73 In ChicagoPrime Packers, the Seller
contracted to sell the Buyer 40,500 pounds of pork back ribs. 74
After the goods were delivered, Buyer refused to pay the price
claiming the goods were in an "off condition." 17 The issue in this
case surrounds who should bear the burden of proving at what
point the goods were in the "off condition" once the risk of loss
passed.176 The court first states that the CISG is to be interpreted
according to the "general principles" upon which the CISG is
based.1 77 However, in its next sentence the court states, "[clase
law interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the [UCCI
may... inform the court where the language of the relevant CISG
provisions tracks that of the UCC." 17 The court cites cases that
interpret "similar" UCC provisions. 17 9 The court determines that
because the UCC and the warranty provision of the CISG (Article
35) have the same "structure," the proper resolution should follow
that found in the UCC.5 0 The Buyer has the burden of proof once
171. See id. at Third Recommendation (Dictamen Tercero).
172. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d
385, 388 (7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that attorneys fees are not "expressly settled" in
the Convention and no principles can be drawn out from the Convention to determine
who bears burden of paying attorneys fees and therefore court must look to rules of
private international law to resolve the matter); cf Schmitz-Werke GMBH & Co. v.
Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. App'x 687, 692 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that the CISG
governs matters of warranties but is silent on who bears the burden of proving the
item was defective).
173. See Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894
(7th Cir. 2005).
174. See id. at 895.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 897.
177. See id. at 898.
178. Id. at 898 (citing Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28
(2nd Cir. 1995)).
179. See id. (citing Comark v. Merch, Inc. v. Highland Group, Inc., 932 F.2d 1196
(7th Cir. 1991); Alberts Bonnie Brad, Inc. v. Ferral, 544 N.E.2d 422, 423 (Ill. App. 4th
1989)).
180. See id.
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the Seller's risk of loss passes.18 ' Many scholars agree with the
resolution, the comparison of the UCC to the CISG is troubling as
a "general principle" upon which the Convention is based. The
court disregards the importance of autonomous interpretation, the
use of foreign case law and interpretive methods such as references to "Restatements" like PECL and UNIDROIT to attempt to
interpret the provisions in the CISG.1 2 This decision, by failing to
give any deference to other courts who have decided similar
issues, contravenes Article 7(1)'s goal of promoting uniformity in
international trade. Endless U.S. cases following erroneous methods of interpretation continue the legacy of a "U.S. centric view of
commercial contract law [that] is no longer tolerated. . .by [its]
foreign trading partners."183
These cases demonstrate that the uniformity principle is far
from being upheld. On the contrary, courts constantly and prematurely refer to their domestic laws and use their domestic lenses to
generate resolutions under an international treaty. Much of the
paradigm is generated from the lack of a uniform understanding
of the "general principles." On the one hand, the general principles are meant to be fluid and evolving and therefore no single
interpretation could be complete. However, the current goals of
the supporters and drafters of the CISG should favor generation of
a methodology for incorporating relevant definitions of the "general principles" that are generated by consensus among the courts
and scholars. Specifically, a guide of general principles needs to
be created as a reference tool that deepens the meaning of "general principles" under Article 7(2), while still permitting the constant change and fluidity that the principle embodies. By
providing judges with better defined tools, the courts will encounter less of a need for over-reliance on domestic laws and will succeed in "promot[ing] uniformity in [the CISG's] application."
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Given the tremendous trade that occurs between and
amongst the Inter-American countries and efforts to continue this
trade through regional agreements, the relevance and importance
of the CISG and uniform contract law is unquestionable. However, there are practical impediments encountered in the applica181.
182.
183.
184.

See id.
See id.
See Callaghan, supra note 23, at 183.
CISG at art. 7(1).
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tion of the CISG. Language barriers and the need for translated
materials make the accessibility of information an enormous
obstacle. Additionally, lack of adequate translations also creates
unintended complexities in interpretation. To a lesser extent, the
absence of a common legal culture and the diverging legal concepts in civil and common law traditions also play a role in the
impediments to uniformity.
There are considerable shortcomings in the text of Article 7(2)
itself in the absence of a common and comprehensive understanding of the meaning of "general principles." This, coupled with the
paradigm of the court's reliance on the "homeward trend," further
intensifies the obstacles facing a uniform application of the CISG.
However, several institutional additions to the application of
the CISG can assist in creating an ease in interpretation and
accessibility of information. A supranational tribunal dealing
with questions of interpretation along with a structured, but
evolving, guideline of what courts should consider "general principles" will help in overcoming the problems of over-reliance on
domestic laws. The solution should also increase the availability
of information that so hinders many countries from proper application of the CISG.

